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Introduction
In the legal profession we like certain beginnings, and it is almost too easy to date the
beginnings of the modern legal profession from 1870. Hubbell’s Legal Directory was just
one year old. The first written bar examinations were introduced in 1870. The Albany Law
Journal was first published on January 8, 1870. That same month, Charles Eliot, the new
President of Harvard University, appointed an 1854 graduate of the law school named
Christopher Columbus Langdell to the faculty. On February 1, the first meeting of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York was held. In the summer of 1870, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., was named co-editor of the American Law Review, and began his
systematic study of jurisprudence resulting ten years later in the publication of The
Common Law. In the fall, Langdell was named to the newly created post of Dean at the
Harvard Law School. When Langdell began his Fall 1870 contracts class by asking, "Mr.
Fox, please state the facts in Bryan v. Cave," the modern legal profession was underway.
This essay is a truncated history of the making of the American legal profession. In contrast
to other efforts, the focus of this paper is on the creation and development of legal
institutions which fostered the belief, by lawyers, in their professionalism. Legal
institutions include not only law schools, bar associations and organizations like the
American Law Institute but also the system of legal directories, the regional case reporter
system developed by the West Publishing Company and continuing legal education groups.
These institutions, which contributed greatly to the making of a distinctly professional
culture in law in America, are closely related to the formation of the system of legal
education first developed at Harvard Law School in 1870. While a number of institutions
were created for instrumental reasons having nothing to do with legal education (like
Hubbell’s Legal Directory and the regional reporter system), these institutions prospered in
part because of their ideological fit with the professionalizing ethos embodied Langdell’s
statement that "law is a science."[1]
Legal institutions, then, must be evaluated through the ideological lens which encouraged
and fostered the notion that lawyers were part of a scientific enterprise. The perception that
law was a science, and lawyers scientists, altered the shape of the legal profession; this
shape was further altered by the development of legal institutions which assumed the
science of law, which thus greatly changed the relationship of the legal profession to
American society. My intention is to examine several legal institutions which assisted in
the transformation of lawyers into such a powerful profession. However, I am not asserting
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that the making of the modern legal profession is simply the result of the creation of law
schools based on the Harvard model. My goal is to recognize the expanding sphere of
influence the American system of legal education had on the American bar.
This essay will first trace the development of legal education beginning in 1870, for the
creation and entrenchment of a university—and post-baccalaureate—based legal education
was the catalyst for many of the developments which followed. I will then examine the
creation and development of selected legal institutions in modern legal times in light of the
history of legal education and their impact on the legal profession. This essay will make
much of the fact that disparate but related events occurred at approximately the same time.
I make this point for two reasons: it satisfies a need lawyers have for order and making
sense of things, and it enables me to tell a better story.
Modern Legal Education[2]
The modern law school is based on the nineteenth century notion that law is a science. On
two occasions, in 1871 in his Preface to the first American casebook, Cases on Contracts,
and in 1886 on the Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of the founding of Harvard
University, Langdell discussed the idea of law as a science.
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To
have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to the evertangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a
true lawyer, and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every
earnest student of law.... But the cases which are useful and necessary for this
purpose at the present day bear an exceedingly small proportion to all that have
been reported. The vast majority are useless, and worse than useless, for any
purpose of systematic study. Moreover, the number of fundamental legal
doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed: the many different guises
in which the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great
extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause of
much apprehension. If these doctrines could be so classified and arranged that
each should be found in its proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease
to be formidable from their number.
[It] was indispensable to establish at least two things, first that the law is a
science: secondly, that all available materials of that science are contained in
printed books. If law be not a science, a university will best consult its own
dignity in declining to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of
handicraft, and many best be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who
practices it. If it be a science, it will scarcely be disputed that it is one of the
greatest and most difficult of sciences, that it needs all the light that the most
enlightened seat of learning can throw upon it. Again, law can be learned and
taught in a university by means of printed books.... [I]f printed books are the
ultimate sources of all legal knowledge; if every student who would obtain any
mastery of law as a science must resort to these ultimate sources: and if the
only assistance which is possible for the learner to receive is such as can be
afforded by teachers who have travelled the same road before him.—then a
university, and a university alone, can furnish every possible facility for
teaching and learning law.... We have also constantly inculcated the idea that
the library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to
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us all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists,
all that the museum of natural history is to the zoologists, all that the botanical
garden is to the botanists.[3]
Langdell’s conviction that law was a [natural] science justified a number of radical changes
in approaches to law: first, law was best learned in school, not as an apprentice to a
practicing lawyer: second, law consisted of a relatively small number of legal principles,
and the mass of material incorporated in treatises written and used by lawyers was useless:
third, only an expert (i.e., professor) dedicated to the study of law, could effectively master
and impart those difficult principles of law: fourth, since the law was based on a small
number of legal principles, the implicit assumption was that the law should be uniform
throughout the United States, and law schools were to teach a form of "nationalized" law
which transcended any particular state law rules: and fifth, the scientific approach was
based on analyzing the "right" cases in search of the basic principles of law, cases selected
by the professor to form a casebook; an attempt by the professor and the class to analyze
these cases took the place of lectures by the professor.
Langdell’s vision appeared both an intellectual advance compared with either the
apprenticeship system or the pedagogical system of lectures, and cost-effective. By
analogizing law to science, Langdell encouraged the belief that prospective lawyers needed
expert and systematic training, training largely not available in an apprenticeship. Langdell
also believed that a proper "Socratic" interchange between the teacher and one student
concerning a case would better teach legal principles not only to that student but also to the
rest of the class. That is, there was no need for a student to participate in the exchange in
order to grasp the scientific principles adduced during the exchange. Therefore, a large
class of students could learn as effectively as a small class of students. A student-teacher
ratio of 75:1 permitted the university (and law school entrepreneurs) to view a law school
as profitable, and from 1870-1890 the number of law schools doubled. In the succeeding
twenty years the number again doubled.
Langdell’s unifying perspective also created a new addition to the legal profession: the
legal mandarin. In 1873, Langdell convinced the Harvard Board of Overseers to approve a
five year contract for James Barr Ames to teach at the law school. Ames had graduated
from Harvard in 1872 and obviously had little practical experience at the bar. However,
Ames had been one of Langdell’s first acolytes and had excelled as a student at Harvard. If
law was a science, Ames’s lack of experience was not a hindrance to his teaching ability,
for the principles of law were found in the library, not in the practice of law. Instead, the
daily practice of law often caused the practitioner to lose sight of the scientific principles
undergirding law, which would make a practitioner less suitable as a law teacher. While
Harvard continued to hire retired judges and practicing attorneys to teach, the hiring of the
inexperienced but academically successful Ames signaled another development created as
a consequence of Langdell’s theory, a development which dominates the present legal
academic world. At the same time, events in the legal profession made law schools a much
more attractive place to educate future lawyers than apprenticeships.
First, law schools appeared to better assist prospective lawyers in entering the legal
profession. Beginning in 1871, the state of New York limited entry into the profession to
those who both passed a public examination and complete either three years of
apprenticeship in a lawyer’s office or one year of law school. In addition, Albany and
Columbia law school graduates were statutorily granted a diploma privilege, which
exempted them from the public examination requirement because they had received law
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degrees. Some prospective lawyers attended law schools rather than apprenticing in law
offices because they perceived the legal science taught in law school as better preparation
for a public (and, beginning in 1877, a written) examination. The diploma privilege
available in New York and other jurisdictions also encouraged prospective lawyers to
attend law school. Finally, the New York statute permitted applicants educated for one year
at law school to take the bar examination while requiring a three-year clerkship for those
not attending law school, which indicated another bias favoring law schools over
apprenticeships.
Second, in August 1878, the American Bar Association (ABA) was founded in Saratoga
Springs, New York.[4] The progenitor of the Association was a Connecticut lawyer and
Yale Law School graduate, Simeon Baldwin. Baldwin’s interest in a national bar
association was intimately related to his conviction that learning law was best
accomplished in a graduate legal education. Among the purposes listed by the founders of
the ABA in Article I of its constitution were advancing "the science of jurisprudence" and
upholding the honor of the legal profession. This latter provision meant, according to
Professor Matzko, "raising standards of legal education and admission to the bar." The next
year the ABA founded a standing committee on legal education to effectuate that goal.
Supporting legal education and disparaging legal apprenticeships was a prominent goal of
the ABA, and this goal was based in part on fostering the science of jurisprudence. The
year before the ABA organized, the New York State Bar Association was founded. One of
its stated purposes was to "cultivate the science of jurisprudence."[5] This unity of purpose
among Langdell and bar organizers like Baldwin may have covered disagreements about
the utility of the case method in understanding the science of jurisprudence, but the broader
goal of viewing law as a science subsumed those narrower pedagogical differences. While
the ABA never accounted for more than a tiny percentage of lawyers during the nineteenth
or early twentieth century, its membership consisted of the "elite" members of the bar and
its influence far outstripped its size.
Third, by 1886, when Langdell spoke at the 250th anniversary of Harvard’s founding, the
university-based, scientific approach to legal education begun at Harvard Law School was
clearly a success. While the Harvard Law School had seen its enrollment drop to a very low
level in the 1882-83 academic year, by 1886 the law school had seen its enrollment surge
and had achieved some degree of financial support from alumni. That same year, elite New
York City practitioners and pre-1870 Harvard Law School graduates James Coolidge
Carter and Joseph H. Choate signed a circular pledging financing support for the law
school, and Louis D. Brandeis organized, as Secretary, the Harvard Law School
Association, an alumni fund-raising organization dedicated to the financial support of the
law school. This financial support from influential practitioners in Boston and New York
secured Langdell’s approach from any attack by other disenchanted alumni. Financial
support also could be used to convince prospective students that law school generally, and
the case method in particular, were viewed favorably by successful practitioners.
Fourth, technological changes, including the telephone and the typewriter, made the
apprenticeship system less important to the profession.[6] Finally, the exponential increase
in the 1870s and 1880s of published case reports necessitated the creation of a group of
experts capable of organizing and critiquing this explosion of law.
By the turn of the century, legal education had triumphed over the apprenticeship system.
More specifically, the case method of instruction had triumphed over the lecture method.
While requirements concerning the among of pre-legal education necessary to enter law
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school and the period of study necessary in law school were debated through the 1920s, the
law school had become the center for learning law. One example of the maturity of the law
schools was the creation in 1900 of the Association of American Law Schools. The AALS
was created by the "better" law schools to differentiate themselves from the mass of law
schools. It additionally cemented the differences between the practitioner and the legal
academic.
The American law school has changed little since its initial triumph in 1900. While there is
a greater variety of courses, teaching methods and approaches to law offered in today’s law
schools, the structure of the law school remains remarkably the same. Law school is a
three-year program, the first year of which largely consists of private law courses taught to
large classes through the primary text of a casebook by an academic whose experience in
the practice of law is limited. Approximately ninety percent of all ABA-accredited law
schools are affiliated with universities which are members of the AALS and require
applicants to possess a college degree before matriculating (the rest require at least three
years of college work). Most of the students’ work after the first year will consist of more
case-oriented courses and library-based research. Clinical offerings are spotty and often not
considered part of the "main" curriculum.
American legal thought since Langdell also has largely adopted (and adapted) the view that
law is a science. The founder of sociological jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound, later Dean at
Harvard Law School, believed that while law was an instrument to obtain justice and not an
autonomous realm, it remained a science. The American legal realists of the 1930s, who
deprecated Langdell’s formalism and Pound’s sociological jurisprudence, also believed that
law was a science: in their view, however, law was a social science rather than a natural
science. The post-World War II jurisprudential theories of reasoned elaboration and law and
economics concluded that law was a rational science. It has only been in the past fifteen
years that law has been viewed as non-scientific.
Turning lawyers into a professional class required more than the incantation that "law is a
science." One requirement was to progressively tighten admission standards for the practice
of law. Law schools contributed to the making of the profession first, by displacing the
apprenticeship system and second, by regulating themselves and the students they admitted
and graduated. While the first goal was achieved by 1900, the second goal required the
creation of several institutions.
The most important institution created by law schools which markedly affected the making
of a legal profession was the Law School Admission Test. The 1920s were a tumultuous
time for legal education and the legal profession, and one "professionalizing" method was
the creation, at Columbia Law School, of a legal aptitude test which followed closely in
time the development of general aptitude tests. The test, given from 1921-24, tested
abstract reasoning and the ability to deal with symbols and was given "to avoid the human
waste of allowing men without requisite capacity to embark upon studies at which they
were doomed to fail."[7] The Columbia test was followed by the Ferson-Stoddard Law
Aptitude Examination in 1925, which was adopted by nine schools. Yale Law School
instituted an aptitude test in 1931. Other schools, including the Universities of California,
Michigan and Iowa, began using aptitude tests before the end of World War II.
The idea of creating an organization to implement uniform admission standards was first
brought to the attention of the AALS in 1938. It was only after the end of World War II,
however, that a Conference on the Legal Aptitude Test met and the Law School Admission
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Test (LSAT) was implemented. Columbia’s Legal Aptitude Test (the Lorge examination)
successfully distinguished the poor student from the rest of the applicants but was
considered unsatisfactory because it did not distinguish between the "good" applicant and
the "excellent" applicant. In 1947 Columbia convinced Harvard and Yale to join it in
financially supporting an examination drafted by the College Entrance Examining Board.
The first Law School Admission Test was given experimentally to first year law students at
seven law schools in 1947. In 1948, the LSAT was given to students in time for use in
admitting students for the 1948-49 academic year. Within ten years the number of LSAT
examinations administered exceeded the number of first year law students enrolled in law
schools, and the LSAT eventually became one of the two "objective" criteria by which
students were selected for admission at all law schools.
An examination which permitted Columbia to distinguish between the good and the
excellent candidate allowed Columbia and other schools to better market their students to
law firms in New York and elsewhere, thus to attract more "qualified" students and to
attract more law firms and (maybe) more funds for the school from alumni grateful that
their diploma was increase in "value." This cycle of success prodded other law schools to
compete with Columbia by being more selective in admitting students. This, combined in
the 1960s and 1970s with a tremendous increase of persons interested in becoming lawyers,
led to high entry barriers into law school and into the legal profession.
By making the LSAT a prerequisite to admission to any law school, entry into law was
further "professionalized" to the extent that it appeared that law school admissions were
merit-based. Entry into the profession was regulated by the nearly universalized
requirement that students be graduates of a law school, and a law school admission was
regulated by admitting only those who performed well on this "objective" test. One way in
which the LSAT was deemed merit-based was by relying on empirical studies which have
shown that there is some correlation between LSAT score and first-year grades. By
assuming the relevance of first-year grades to the making of a competent lawyer, the LSAT
is made more objective. Of course, there is no empirical study showing that the
competency of a lawyer is based on their first-year grades. It is simply assumed that law
school teaches students in the science of jurisprudence, and it is particularly assumed that
the Langdellian-based first year of law school teaches the science of law. The acceptance of
the LSAT, then, by law schools as well as by law firms is an acceptance of the system of
legal education based on Langdell’s ideas. There is no evidence (and I doubt there could be
any such proof) correlating LSAT scores with lawyerly competence or ability.
The stature of the legal profession was enhanced as entry requirements into law schools
were raised. In the last fifty years, since lawyers attend law school (almost always) only
after graduation from college, the seven years of education after high school could be used
to justify the power and income (and maybe prestige) of lawyers. Beginning after World
War II, law schools admitted only those students who deserved admission based on the
objective criteria of their undergraduate grade point average and LSAT score, which
reinforced notions of selectivity in entry into the legal profession.
Making lawyers professionals required the development of a number of other institutions,
many of which were related to Langdell’s belief that law was a science. In the next section
I will discuss a few of those institutions which have helped create present perceptions of
the American legal profession.
Modern Legal Institutions
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Uniformity and Legal Institutions
Cultivating the science of jurisprudence and enhancing the status of its members also led
the ABA to include in its initial list of purposes the goal of uniformity in law. By asserting
that there existed only a few principles of law and by compiling a list of (mostly English)
cases from which to derive those principles, the legal science of Langdell implicitly
assumed that there should be a uniformity of law. One of the most persistent ideas in
modern American law is that uniformity of law in the United States is both desirable and
capable of accomplishment.
In 1881, the Alabama State Bar proposed to the ABA and other state bar associations that
they support efforts to create uniformity in law throughout the states. No action was taken
until 1889, when the ABA created a Committee on Uniform State Laws, consisting of one
member from each state. The next year the New York state legislature passed an act
authorizing the governor to appoint three commissioners whose duty it was to study
uniformity. The ABA immediately passed a resolution calling for all states to pass an act
similar to the New York act. In 1892, commissioners from eight states attended the first
meeting of the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, held at the same time as the annual
ABA meeting.
The first effort of the organization, which altered its name in 1896 to the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was a Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, adopted by the Conference that same year. According to Harvard Law
School historian (and Professor) Arthur Sutherland, Harvard Law School Dean James Barr
Ames, author of Cases on Bills and Notes, was unaware of the existence of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law until four states had already passed the law. Ames, who had
succeeded Langdell as Dean at Harvard in 1895, criticized the uniform law in an article
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1900. By this time, the uniform law had been
enacted by fifteen states and Congress. Ames’s criticism was that the technical drafting
defects of the law required its abolition. This article sparked a law review debate between
Ames and the President of the Conference.
While Ames lost the battle (the Negotiable Instruments Law was eventually enacted by
every state), he, on behalf of legal academics, won the war. Ames was appointed a
Commissioner on Uniform Laws by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1902, and the
Conference shortly thereafter appointed Harvard Law School Professor Samuel Williston to
draft the Uniform Sales Act, adopted by the Conference in 1906. By 1910, Williston had
further authored or co-authored for the Conference the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. Williston was the
first of a long line of academics, largely academics at "elite" law schools, who have been
asked to lend their expertise to uniform or model legislation.
Two patterns emerged from this delegation of authority by practitioners to academics: First,
the Acts required interpretation, which academics offered by writing treatises and other
interpretive guides for use by practitioners. Williston followed his work on the Uniform
Sales Act with a 1909 treatise on the law of sales, in large part a commentary on the
Uniform Sales Act. Williston later followed his work as Reporter for the Restatement of
Contracts with a multi-volume new edition of his treatise on contracts. Second, it
confirmed two views: one, that uniformity in law was possible and two, that legal
academics, as the scientists of the legal profession, were in a better position than
practitioners to guide efforts to make uniform law.
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The profession’s efforts to make law more uniform was a consequence of the gradual
acceptance, within and without the law school, that law was a science. It was also a
response to the realization that decisions by courts in the different states were not uniform,
a realization caused by the publication by West Publishing Company of all the cases
decided by the highest court of each of the states. These efforts eventually led to the
formation of the American Law Institute in 1923.
In 1914, when the Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar
Association first held their annual meetings separately, the president of the AALS
suggested the creation of a juristic center. It was not until 1920, after the end of World War
I, that the idea was revived. The proposal to revive a juristic center was analogized to the
Commonwealth Fund which that same year had organized a Legal Research Committee to
aid legal reform. The nature and scope of the center was altered in the intervening years,
and in February 1923, the first meeting of the American Law Institute (ALI) was held in
Washington, DC before an unprecedented gathering of the nation’s legal elite, including
Elihu Root, the first President of the ALI, and William Draper Lewis, the first Executive
Secretary of the ALI.
Shortly before the formation of the ALI, Root and Lewis had suggested to the bar a
uniformity of another sort: uniformity of legal education. The AALS and the ABA had both
attempted to induce some stringent regulation of law schools since 1900. In 1910, the
Carnegie Foundation published the Flexner Report, which examined the education offered
by all medical schools. The medical profession used the Flexner Report to influence states
to close some medical schools, raise admission standards and the quality of medical
schools and to enhance their professional status. In the forty years since Langdell had
become Dean at Harvard, the number of law schools had quadrupled to 124. In 1913, the
ABA’s Section on Legal Education invited the Carnegie Foundation to undertake a similar
study of law schools. Alfred Z. Reed, a non-lawyer, was assigned to the study. While Reed
was visiting law schools and readying his report, professors whose schools belonged to the
AALS packed the 1920 meeting of the Section on Legal Education of the ABA and caused
the appointment of a Committee on Legal Education. This committee, chaired by Elihu
Root, prepared a report adopted the next year which declared that (1) law school was the
only place to obtain an adequate legal education, (2) two years or university studies were a
necessary prerequisite to law school admission and (3) the diploma privilege was formally
disapproved.
A month after Root’s report was published, Reed’s study, Training for the Public
Profession of the Law, suggested that uniform standards for law schools would not benefit
either the profession or the public(s) the profession served. Reed noted that the legal
profession was presently a diverse profession: since American society was growing more
pluralistic, this diversity in the profession was to be encouraged, not suppressed.
Consequently, the training of lawyers by different kinds of law schools with different goals
and missions was beneficial to society.
Neither the ABA nor the AALS approved of Reed’s study and both took steps to create
uniformity in the legal profession. Beginning in 1923, in the same year as the founding of
the ALI, the ABA began accrediting law schools based on uniform standards to be applied
to all law schools. While at first this had little coercive impact on law schools, the ABA
began encouraging states to limit the bar examination to persons who were graduates of
ABA-accredited law schools. In 1935, only nine states required an examinee to have
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graduated from an ABA-accredited law school while in 1984, forty-eight states had such a
requirement.[8] The AALS also progressively toughened its accreditation standards while
encouraging schools to join the association. The AALS, through individual professors at
several of its most prominent institutions, also assisted in creating uniformity through the
ALI’s Restatement project.
The purpose of the ALI was to clarify and simplify the common law via a Restatement of
the Law. When completed in 1944, the project to restate the law encompassed the
restatement of the law of Agency (1923-33), Conflict of Laws (1923-34), Contracts
(1923-32), Restitution (1923-37), Torts (1923-39), Property (1927-44), Trusts (1927-35),
Security (1936-41) and Judgments (1940-42); it is undoubtedly the most successful effort
to alter law in American legal history. The certainty by which most of the Restatements
declared the correct law, their impeccable establishment credentials and the timing of the
publication of the Restatements made them an instant success.
The cases published by West evidenced an inescapable problem which the restatements
were to resolve in a federal system in which opposing or inconsistent legal rules existed
side by side. How did lawyers or judges capable of choosing between these inconsistent
rules justify one as correct and the other as incorrect? The Restatement of the Law was
designed to provide an answer to which those perplexed lawyers and judges could turn. The
Restatements drafted and approved by the ALI consisted literally of black-letter rules
followed by illustrative commentary and examples. The black-letter rule enunciated by the
Restatement was intended to give lawmakers a confidence that their decisions would be
correct. Additionally, society could be confident of the correctness of the restated position
because of pre-eminence of the drafters of the restatements. The committee assigned to
prepare a particular restatement consisted of prominent practitioners, judges and an
occasional professor. The Reporter for the committee, the person who ordinarily drafted the
Restatement, was almost always a law professor, the expert in the field. After the Reporter
prepared a draft of the Restatement, it would be debated by the committee and the ALI
Council and only after a lengthy, time consuming process would the draft be approved.
This bureaucratic structure, giving experts the power to decide the "law," served as a
purportedly neutral, objective basis for courts to adopt the restatement rule and to reject any
contrary legal rule.
The belief in the neutrality and objectivity of the Restatements was important because of
the timing of their publication. The Restatements were published between 1932 and 1944,
with the bulk published in the 1930s. This timing was propitious for two reasons: First, the
Restatements were themselves a response were themselves a response to the charge that
legal rules had no intrinsic meaning, a charge made by a number of legal academics who
were grouped together as legal realists. This charge, in its most serious vein, was that the
rule of law was a myth; judges decided cases in a subjective politicized manner, not as
objective law (or rule) abiding magistrates. This realist attack eliminated any possibility of
certainty in the law. Second, the Great Depression and the growing interest in socialistic
and regulatory solutions to end the depression threatened the largely conservative order in
which the legal profession had a great stake; the Restatements of the Law were
conservative legal responses to societal changes because they assumed the dominance of
judge-made common law.
The acceptance by the profession of the Restatements was immediate. The individual
restatements were cited in support of appellate court decisions thousands of times after
their adoption. The ALI eventually compiled a work which noted the citations in cases to
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provisions of the Restatements.
As the work wound down in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the ALI began working on
model codes. Here, its success was much more limited: for example, the Model Code of
Evidence, proposed in 1942, was not adopted by any state. The ALI had more success
when it worked with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Their joint effort to fashion a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) resulted in the adoption of
the UCC in all states except Louisiana.
The success of the Restatement of the Law, however, lasted only a for a short time. In 1953,
a mere nine years after the adoption of the last Restatement, the ALI began working on a
Second Restatement of the Law. Since "United States judges no longer believe that stare
decisis demands slavishly following earlier decisions," it was necessary to again restate the
law in order to ensure the relevance of the restatements.[9] The result was a Restatement
(Second) and, currently, the beginnings of a Restatement (Third). Unlike the Restatement
(First), which was designed to create certainty in law, the project of the Restatement
(Second) was to restore the autonomy of law from politics by acknowledging but limiting
(through the rules of the Restatement) the discretion granted judges. This alteration in the
Restatement project, however, did not affect the overarching view that uniformity in law
was both possible and desirable. Law remained a science.
A final example of uniformity is the bar examination. In 1870, a written bar examination
existed only in some counties in Massachusetts. By 1931, when the National Conference of
Bar Examiners (NCBE) was created, thirty-eight states required passage of a written
examination and ten states required bar applicants to pass some combination of written and
oral examination. Part of the reason for the NCBE’s existence was to ensure the
"professionalism" of lawyers by making more uniform bar examination requirements
among the states. The NCBE first wielded power uniform the character investigation of a
lawyer who applied to another state for a license to practice law. It also worked to make
uniform other aspects of licensure, like the type and form of the bar examination. In 1972,
the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) was first introduced as part of a bar examination.
Today, the MBE is used by nearly all jurisdictions as a substantial part of their examination.
The Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE), introduced in March
1980 and then required by six states, is now required by forty jurisdictions. Additionally,
several states have expressed an interest in adopting the Multistate Essay Examination
(MEE), introduced in 1988.
The interest in uniformity in bar examinations has not led to a uniform—or even
national—bar. Instead, uniformity has led to the creation of bar review organizations such
as BAR/BRI and PMBR, organizations which teach law school graduates how to pass the
various bar examinations. The organizations’ lectures are given almost exclusively by law
professors (and several bar review organizations were in fact started by law professors).
This profitable business allows law schools to continue to say they teach students the
science of law, gives law professors the opportunity to earn extra income for teaching bar
review courses and allows the profession to insist to the public (without any empirical
evidence) that bar examinations test competence, thus providing a method of quality
control.
Legal Publications
In 1870, the Albany Law Journal, a weekly newspaper for lawyers, joined the monthly
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American Law Register and the quarterly American Law Review as commercial periodicals
devoted to the legal profession.[10] The Albany Law Journal was not intended as a local
paper; it succeeded as a national journal of the legal profession, thus contributing to the
perception of a unified legal profession. The success of the Albany law Journal inspired
others to start law-related journals, including the Central Law Journal, based in St. Louis,
and a number of other law journals in America’s larger cities. These other journals, like
nascent state and local bar associations, encouraged professionalism. One stated goal of
these periodicals was to improve the image of the legal profession; it actually may have
done so by informing lawyers of the most recent decisions handed down by the courts.
A year after the appearance of the Albany Law Journal, the company that is now Lawyers
Cooperative/Bancroft-Whitney began publishing a series of selected leading cases from the
states with annotations. These American Reports were a handy guide to understanding the
most "important" cases recently decided. Five years later, two brothers started reporting
selected cases decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court. As early as 1878, the brothers
were publishing all the cases in Minnesota and five adjoining states in the Northwestern
Reporter.
The West Publishing Company expanded in 1887 to publish, in seven regional reporters, all
of the decisions of the highest court of each state in the country. It also published the
decisions of the federal courts. That same year, a group of industrious students at the
Harvard law School, buoyed by the 1886 commemoration of the 250th anniversary of
Harvard University and the founding of the Harvard Law School Association, decided to
publish a review of law. These events were crucial to creating a professional image for
lawyers in several respects. First, the publication of regional reporters both democratized
and professionalized lawyers. Regional reporters and commercial law journals
democratized lawyers by giving them easier access to a greater number of analogous cases;
it professionalized lawyers by permitting courts to require lawyers to undertake a greater
amount of research when the case involved difficult or unsettled legal issues. For example,
by the time of the publication of the First Decennial Digest in 1897, West Publishing
Company (possibly in an effort to market the Digest) claimed that there were over half a
million reported cases. Second, the publication of all reported cases placed greater pressure
on appellate court judges to justify their decisions, either on substantive (legal) grounds, or
on procedural (standards of review) grounds. The development of law journals, especially
student-run law reviews, also affected the decisions of appellate court judges, for these
journals provided a forum for a more searching criticism of recent decisions by both
authors of articles and student editors. Third, the regional reporters provided an overflow of
data for lawyers to comprehend, which privileged the organizational knowledge of
professors whose treatises and casebooks attempted to systematize the data, and made more
attractive the view that law was a science consisting of relatively few principles. One result
of the effort to systematize the data, as discussed above, was the founding of the American
Law Institute. Thus, the organizing and systematizing of the common law was left in the
hands of the legal academics.
The creation of the student-run law review also contributed to the pre-eminence of
professorial commentary. Purportedly meritocratic, the law reviews limited membership to
students at the top of their class. That is, only those students who thought most like their
professors would be admitted to the law review. This meant that the students operating the
law review were of a similar mind as their professors, which skewed the views afforded the
publication. Second, the class of legal professionals who enjoyed the most time to write for
these reviews were law professors, thus giving the professor another forum for advancing
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his views.
While the Albany Law Journal, the Central Law Journal, the American Law Register and
the American Law Review and most other commercial law journals ceased publication early
in the twentieth century, the law school-based law review proliferated. While there existed
only two law school-based law reviews before 1900, nearly every law school today has at
least one (and often more than one) review edited by law students. This imitation of the
Harvard model has encased a review structured by Langdell’s maxim, for the usual output
of a review consists of one or more articles written by law professors and one or more
comments and case notes critically reviewing an aspect of law written by students.
Continuing Legal Education
Law schools claim to teach their students in legal reasoning. To better teach students in the
science of law and legal reasoning, the non-practicing professor contributed to the
profession by writing a treatise or casebook, the later being largely a compilation of
"relevant" appellate cases. In 1932, Jerome Frank, whose 1930 book Law and the Modern
Mind had challenged the objectivity of judicial decision-making, suggested that the law
school, in part because of the casebook method of studying appellate decisions, had
become too academic and Langdell’s "false dogmas" needed to be repudiated. Frank’s plea
for clinical programs in law schools was largely ignored until the 1960s and later. Instead
of reforming or transforming legal education, other institutions began supplementing the
education of students in law school. Larger law firms were able to supplement the
"scientific" education of new lawyers by training their new associates in programs designed
by the firm for the benefit of the firm. In the 1930s, however, most law firms could not
afford the costs associated with this training program. In the depths of the Depression, a
New York City practitioner named Harold Seligson found a niche offering a "practical"
education in law. Seligson offered Practising Law Courses taught by four practitioners. In
1936, nine courses were being taught by forty practitioners covering 180 hours of
instruction. Lawyers interested in the program began by attending sixty hours (thirty
two-hour sessions) of general courses and then "graduating" to specialized courses.
Seligson’s "Practicing Law Courses" were then organized under the banner of the
Practising Law Institute (PLI).
Seligson informed the ABA about PLI’s efforts regarding continuing legal education in the
late 1930s, and while the ABA resolved to sponsor such a program, no action was taken
until after World War II. In 1946, the ABA decided to sponsor a national continuing legal
education program. It chose not align itself with PLI but with the ALI, and ALI-ABA
continuing legal programs began in 1948. The greater national reputations of both the ALI
and the ABA effectively restricted the PLI to programs in New York for the next twenty
years.
The displacement of PLI by ALI-ABA was an attempt to alter the goal of continuing legal
education from training the new lawyer in the "practice" of law to making experienced
lawyers better "experts" in specialized fields of law. Four reasons explain the change: First,
the establishment-oriented ALI and ABA, as strong supporters of the three-year university-
based, casebook-saturated law school, were opposed to officially recognizing a grievous
fault in legal education, that is, the failure to train lawyers how to practice law. The ABA,
after all, accredited many of these law schools, thereby putting its reputation on the line,
and the ALI consisted largely of graduates of and professors from "elite" law schools who
fervently supported the system structured by Langdell. Second, the explosion in law
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created by the entrenchment of the administrative state, as well as developments occurring
in "private" law, required a much greater need for lawyers by those businesses subject to
federal regulation and changes in the common law. Third, the PLI was created when the
national bar passage rate was less than fifty percent, and economic hard times made it
difficult for many of those who had entered the profession to find jobs (or to find work as
self-employed sole practitioners). In contrast, the national bar passage rate in 1948, near the
beginning of America’s long economic boom, was sixty percent, and the benefits from the
GI bill gave students an incentive to attend an ABA-accredited law school rather than an
unaccredited law school. Fourth, the teaming of two widely recognized legal organizations
for the purpose of sponsoring continuing legal education programs would create a
competitor so large and powerful that it would dominate the market.
There are three other developments in the legal profession which affected continuing legal
education: graduate legal education leading to the Master of Laws (LL.M.) or other
degrees, making mandatory to continued licensure continuing legal education (CLE) and
the advent of legal specialization.
By the 1930s, a number of schools had programs allowing a person who had received a
Bachelor Laws (LL.B., now a J.D.) degree to spend one year as a graduate student and
receive a graduate law degree. These programs were designed for two purposes: training
future law teachers and training lawyers in a specific area of practice. To train future law
teachers by inviting them to spend a fourth year in law school confirmed the belief that law
was understood best in the classroom and library, as Langdell had suggested.
The interest in training lawyers in a specific area of practice was the result of several
factors. First, the graduate law degree eventually became a shortcut for attorneys interested
in becoming experts in number of legal fields which burgeoned with the creation of the
administrative state. The degree itself became "proof" of the attorney’s expertise in a given
legal practice specialty and thus differentiated the attorney in the legal marketplace.
Second, the majority of graduate programs opened in the last twenty-five years offer an
opportunity for law schools to earn an enormous profit, since most of the courses are taught
by adjunct professors whose pay is minimal, the student-teacher ratios remain higher than
other graduate education, and ABA-accreditation standards for graduate education are
slight. Over twenty-five law schools (one out of every seven ABA-accredited law schools)
presently offer a graduate degree specializing in taxation, which can only be explained by
the belief that tax lawyers need a graduate law degree and the likelihood that these
programs are very profitable. Third, since law schools are not permitted by ABA
accrediting regulations to offer "majors" in their basic educational program, a school can
differentiate itself within the law school market by trumpeting a graduate program which
offers a practice specialization. Since graduate level courses are ordinarily open to all
students, this marketing tool may entice some entering students to enroll who otherwise
might matriculate elsewhere. George Washington University, for example, offers graduate
degrees specializing in administrative law, corporate law, criminal law, environmental law,
government contracts law, land use law, law and poverty, patent law, tax law and urban law.
Mandatory continuing legal education was first broached in 1971. After a study of several
years, the Minnesota Supreme Court instituted mandatory continuing legal education
beginning in 1975. Iowa and Wisconsin created similar programs that same year. While
only nine states approved a mandatory continuing legal education program in the 1970s,
today at least thirty-seven states have some program. The reason given for mandatory
continuing legal education was the necessity of ensuring continued attorney competence as
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laws changed. Of course, the connection between continuing legal education and attorney
competence was not empirically verified; it was simply assumed.
It is likely that the rush to mandatory continuing legal education was the result of a crisis in
confidence in the bar. The Watergate scandal, which resulted in an ABA-required
professional responsibility course (or a commitment to teach professional responsibility
issues in doctrinal courses) for all law students, as well as the MPRE, encouraged the bar to
create programs restoring the public’s confidence in the professionalism of lawyers.
Mandatory CLE informed the public that lawyers were duty-bound to remain competent
and that the state would revoke their license if they failed to meet these competency
requirements.
The proliferation of mandatory CLE resulted in the proliferation of organizations supplying
programs satisfying CLE requirements. For example, the State Bar of Wisconsin lists over
seventy organizations which have been granted general program approval. The best known
of these organizations is the National Institute of Trial Advocacy (NITA), formed in 1970
to "contribute to the development of an adequately trained, professionally responsible trial
bar, sufficient to serve the needs of justice in the United States."[11] NITA programs draw
practitioners from all over the country, and it has now begun to sell casebooks as well as
practitioner manuals and guides. Like bar review organizations, NITA and other similar
CLE organizations affect law schools in two ways: First, CLE organizations perpetuate the
dichotomy between the science of law taught in law schools and the practice of law taught
by CLE organizations. Second, like bar review organizations, CLE groups enhance the
power of professors, who are over-represented as speakers and panelists in CLE.
A legal specialization program allows an attorney to claim an expertise not just as a
licensed lawyer but as a lawyer certified by a board of legal specialization as particularly
expert in a defined area of law. The first legal specialization program was instituted in
1971, the same year discussions concerning mandatory CLE began. Both California and
Texas developed standards in 1971, and today thirteen states have adopted some legal
specialization program. Before the end of the 1970s, the ABA had approved a Model Plan
for Specialization. Under the Model Plan, a lawyer must (1) substantially engage in
practice in the area of specialty and (2) complete at least ten CLE hours a year in that field
in the three years before applying for certification as a specialist. Additionally, a peer
review committee assesses the qualifications of each applicant before certifying the
applicant.
The legal profession analogized itself to the medical profession, and a number of lawyers
argued that the sharply rising curve of knowledge in law, as in medicine, necessitated
public recognition of the specialization of legal practice. This scientific analogy allowed
lawyers and the public to continue to think of law as a science. The ideology of legal
specialization is the attempt to reclaim the scientific "nature" of law. Its instrumental value
is in differentiating suppliers of legal services.
The method of specialization in law, unlike the method in medicine, places only a slight
burden on the lawyer-applicant. The ABA’s "substantial practice" requirement, for
example, means a mere twenty-five percent of the lawyer’s practice is devoted to that area
of practice. The ABA’s requirement that a specialist complete ten hours per year of CLE
courses is minimal, since most states mandating CLE as a condition of continued licensure
require all lawyers, not just specialists, to spend at least ten hours per year in continuing
legal education. Certification as a specialist under the ABA Model Plan requires little of the
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lawyer and promises another marketing tool allowing lawyers to declaim their
professionalism.
Conclusion
The transformation of the practice of law from a "trade" into a "profession" was in large
part fortuitous. The utility of lawyers to the industrial and financial economies made some
lawyers integral parts of American capitalism. This rise in their prestige was consolidated
in part by the creation of organizations such as the ABA which fostered the belief in the
professionalism of lawyers. The members of the ABA and other elite practitioners
supported the emergence of a "scientific" view of law and legal education, a view which
also supported the professionalization of law. The embrace by prominent practitioners and
elite organizations of the science of legal education increased the prestige and influence of
law schools; the profitability of law schools (which resulted in a great increase in their
number) and the decline, for various reasons, of legal apprenticeships, made legal
education a more popular way of entering the practice of law. The legal professoriate
assumed the responsibility of created coherence in law by clarifying and unifying legal
doctrines through legal treatises and uniform acts. The rise of the administrative state in the
early to mid-twentieth century also solidified the making of a legal profession. The
regulation of the economy by the government created a need for more lawyers, particularly
lawyers with knowledge in particular legal fields. This expansion of law was channeled by
the Restatements and by the creation of continuing legal education.
The study of selected legal institutions in this essay provides only a glimpse of the
relationship between the vision of law as a science and the development of the American
legal profession. A multiplicity of factors, many of them historically contingent, operated
to create the perceptions of lawyers as professionals. The story told here, like all stories,
tells us only a little something.
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